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I  Introduction
I borrow the title of this paper, slightly amended, from Parsons’ recent 
‘Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?’1 Four-dimen-
sionalism, as I use the term, is the view that persisting objects have four 
dimensions: they are four-dimensional ‘worms’ in space-time. This 
view is contrasted with three-dimensionalism, the view that persisting 
objects have three-dimensions and are wholly present at each moment 
at which they exist. The most common version of four-dimensionalism 
is perdurantism, according to which these four-dimensional objects are 
segmented into temporal parts — shorter lived objects that compose 
the four-dimensional whole in just the same way that the segments of 
real earth worms compose the whole worm.
According to Parsons, a four-dimensionalist need not believe in tem-
poral parts. But ought a four-dimensionalist to believe in temporal 
 1 Parsons, J. ‘Must a Four Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?’ The Monist 83 
(2000) 399-418.
620 Kristie Miller
parts? This question might be thought uninteresting, insofar as it has 
largely been answered by force of numbers. But asking it is instructive. 
For there are reasons to suppose that a non-perdurantist four-dimen-
sionalism might provide an attractive middle position between perdu-
rantism and endurantism:2 a position that avoids many of the different 
counterintuitive costs associated with each of these views. So it is worth 
determining whether non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism is a viable 
theory of persistence. To that end I develop the most plausible non-per-
durantist version of four-dimensionalism.
Ultimately, however, I argue that non-perdurantist four-dimension-
alism does not offer a plausible middle ground position between per-
durantism and endurantism. Further, in considering the reasons why 
non-perdurantism is unappealing, a number of problems are revealed 
for endurantism. Much of what is problematic about non-perdurantism 
is equally problematic for endurantism. What is illuminating is that the 
analogous problems we discover for endurantism are not those that 
typically constitute objections to the view. This is because evaluating 
non-perdurantism allows us to abstract away from two issues that cloud 
the debate between three- and four-dimensionalists: fi rst, the idea that 
three-dimensional objects are wholly present whenever they exist, and 
the associated problems with cashing out this notion; and second, the 
idea that three-dimensional objects are strictly identical to themselves 
at every time at which they exist, and the attendant problems with that 
notion in the light of change across time. Abstracting away from these 
issues is fruitful, because frequently with respect to these issues, debate 
on either side reduces to an appeal to brute intuition leaving the debate 
stagnant.
That endurantism faces the same problems as non-perdurantist 
four-dimensionalism tells us that the debate between perdurantists 
and endurantists has been misplaced. We discover that perdurantism 
is in some sense resilient: as soon as we move away from a perdura-
ntist to a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism, the account exhibits 
fundamental problems. What is wrong with endurantism is not that it 
embraces identity across time, rather, what is problematic is that it is 
non-perdurantist. Non-perdurantist theories of persistence fail because 
ultimately, temporal parts are resilient: we need them in any account of 
persistence.
I begin by outlining some reasons to fi nd non-perdurantist four-
dimensionalism an attractive view. Then in sections three, four and fi ve 
I set out a more detailed account of a non-perdurantist four-dimension-
 2 I use ‘endurantism’ as synonymous with ‘three-dimensionalism.’
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alism. This allows us, in section six, to see the shortcomings of such a 
position. In this section I outline a number of key objections to non-
perdurantism, before in section seven arguing that analogous problems 
arise for endurantism.
II  A Middle-ground Position
This section aims to motivate the idea that a non-perdurantist four-
dimensionalism — non-perdurantism as I call the view — might be 
attractive. To do so I will make two assumptions. First, that the key 
objections to endurantism and perdurantism are widely known and 
do not require explication here. Second, that although the details of 
non-perdurantism are left to section three, we have a suffi cient grasp 
of the general idea of non-perdurantism to see, at least prima facie, why 
it might be thought appealing.
The general idea then, is that persisting objects are four-dimensional 
— they are temporally extended — but not in virtue of being composed 
of (maximal) temporal parts:3 non-perduring four-dimensional objects 
are space-time worms, but they are not segmented worms. In brief, here 
are some reasons why we might fi nd the view congenial.
There are two key objections to endurantism.
(1)  Endurantists can offer no substantive account of what it means 
for an object to be ‘wholly present’ at a time. 
4
and
(2)  Endurantists hold that enduring objects are strictly identical 
across time. But enduring objects change over time, and hence 
have different properties at different times. To accommodate 
both strict identity and change, endurantists need to appeal to 
 3 Thus x is an instantaneous maximal temporal part of y at instant t=df 1) x is part 
of y and 2) x exists at, but only at t and 3) x overlaps every part of y that exists at 
t. An extended maximal temporal part of y during temporal interval T is an object 
that exists at all and only times in T, is part of y at every time during T and at every 
moment in T overlaps everything that is part of y at that moment.
 4 T. Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford 
University Press 2001), 65-8. T. Merricks, ‘Persistence, Parts and Presentism,’ Nous 
33 (1999) 421-38; M. Hinchliff, ‘The Puzzle of Change,’ Philosophical Perspectives 
10, Metaphysics (1996) 119-33; N. Markosian, ‘The 3D/4D Controversy and Non-
Present Objects,’ Philosophical Papers 23 (1994) 243-9.
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a dissatisfying account of the nature of intrinsic properties that 
involve recherché ways of temporally modifying properties or 
their mode of instantiation. 
5
There are two key objections to perdurantism.
(1a)  Perdurantists are committed to the implausible and ontologi-
cally profl igate claim that what seems like a single persisting 
object is really a series of distinct short-lived and temporally 
overlapping6 objects that come into and pass out of existence 
before our eyes.
and
(2a)  Persisting objects often change properties over time. For per-
durantists, this means that temporary properties are proper-
ties of temporal parts, not straightforwardly properties of the 
whole persisting object. So perdurantists have a dissatisfying 
account of the nature of intrinsic properties.7
Non-perdurantism prima facie fares better than either of these views 
with respect to each of these problems. The non-perdurantist can deal 
with (1a) by agreeing with the endurantist that an ontology of temporal 
parts is counterintuitive and metaphysically profl igate. She can agree 
that where we see a single persisting object, there really does exist a 
single persisting object and not a myriad of temporally overlapping 
objects. She can concur with the endurantist in denying that persisting 
objects are only partly present whenever they exist, at least as long as 
we assume that a persisting object is partly present at a time iff some 
proper part of it exists at that time.
On the other hand, denying that persisting objects are only partly 
present whenever they exist does not entail affi rming that they are 
wholly present whenever they exist. The non-perdurantist holds that 
 5 P. van Inwagen, ‘Four-Dimensional Objects,’ Nous 24 (1990) 245-55; S. Haslanger, 
‘Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics,’ Analysis 49 (1989) 119-25; M. Johnston, ‘Is 
There a Problem about Persistence?’ The Aristotelian Society Supp 61 (1987) 107-35.
 6 Persisting objects A and B temporally overlap just in case there is some time t, such 
that at t, A and B materially coincide. Then for the perdurantist, A and B temporally 
overlap just if either A is a maximal temporal part of B, or B is a maximal temporal 
part of A. 
 7 M. Hinchliff, ‘The Puzzle of Change.’ Philosophical Perspectives 10, Metaphysics 
(1996) 119-133.
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persisting objects are temporally extended, and are hence not wholly 
present whenever they exist, at least given a plausible interpretation 
of the endurantist notion. So the non-perdurantist is not committed to 
defending or defi ning the notion of being wholly present, and hence is 
not concerned by (1).
Moreover, the non-perdurantist denies that persisting objects are 
strictly identical to themselves at every time at which they exist. Like all 
objects, non-perduring things are strictly self-identical, but they are not 
strictly identical across time in the sense employed by the endurantist. 
Endurantists, perdurantists, and non-perdurantist four-dimensional-
ists all agree that persisting objects occupy8 four-dimensional regions 
of space. And each agrees that we can divide up a four-dimensional 
region of space into a series of contiguous three-dimensional regions. 
Call each of these three-dimensional regions a three-dimensional ‘slice’ 
of space-time. Endurantists and perdurantists both hold that if R is a 
four-dimensional region occupied by persisting object O, then for any 
three-dimensional slice of R, there is an object that wholly occupies that 
slice.9 The endurantist claim that persisting objects are strict identity 
over time is then the claim for any objects O1 and O2 that occupy slices 
S1 and S2 of R, O1 and O2 are strictly identical: each is O, wholly pres-
ent, at a different time. The perdurantist claims that for any objects O1 
and O2 that occupy slices S1 and S2 of R, O1 and O2 are distinct: each 
is a temporal part of O. The non-perdurantist also rejects the three-
dimensionalist’s claim about strict identity over time, since for her no 
slice is wholly occupied by any object, so no sense can be made of the 
claim that what occupies one slice is strictly identical to what occu-
pies another slice. But the sense of strict identity according to which 
what wholly occupies one slice is strictly identical to what occupies 
a distinct slice despite the fact that each of these occupants has dis-
tinct properties, is what causes problems for the endurantist and forces 
her to adopt recherché accounts of property instantiation. Prima facie 
then, one might expect the non-perdurantist to escape the need for such 
accounts, given that she rejects this strict identity. If that is so, then (2) 
is not a problem.
It is less clear exactly how the non-perdurantist fares with respect 
to (2a). Certainly she can agree with the endurantist that a perdura-
 8 Perdurantists might think that they are identical to such regions, but set that aside 
for now. 
 9 Where an object O wholly occupies a region R just in case every part of O occupies 
a region of R, and no proper part of O occupies any region that is not a sub-region 
of R. 
624 Kristie Miller
ntist account of property instantiation is problematic. Since the non-
perdurantist has no ontology of temporal parts, she can agree that the 
attribution of intrinsic properties to an object cannot be a matter of 
attributing that property to some part of that object. Exactly how the 
non-perdurantist should make sense of temporary intrinsics is more 
diffi cult. We can see, broadly speaking, how she might begin to frame 
such an account. Consider spatially extended mereological simples that 
have different properties at different space-time points or locations at 
which they exist. Such an extended simple might be ‘half’ orange and 
‘half’ purple, despite there being no proper parts that are orange and 
purple respectively. Yet it is a property of the whole simple that it is 
orange at certain locations. By analogy, the non-perdurantist might say 
that the whole four-dimensional worm has properties at (spatio-tem-
poral) locations. A sophisticated version of something like this view 
has been defended by Parsons, who argues for the existence of distri-
butional properties.10 It is fair to say then, that non-perdurantism offers 
the possibility of resolving (2a) in a more attractive manner than per-
durantism, though more work would need to be done to show exactly 
how property instantiation would work.
Since non-perdurantism appears to fare better with respect to (1), 
(2), (1a) and, possibly, (2a), this suggests it might be a viable alterna-
tive to either perdurantism or endurantism. Given this, it behoves us 
to develop such a view in more detail. It is to this that I turn in the fol-
lowing section.
III  Terdurantism: Non-perdurantist Four-dimensionalism
Hitherto I have talked of non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism, or 
just non-perdurantism. These are not perspicacious labels: they don’t 
not tell us in what manner ‘non-perduring’ objects persist. Parsons 
describes these objects as enduring. But it is standard to think of endur-
ance as the manner in which three-dimensional objects persist. Given 
this, the possibility of non-perduring four-dimensional objects suggests 
there are three ways of persisting.11 Call the third way terdurance. Non-
perdurantist four-dimensionalists hold that persisting objects terdure, 
10 J. Parsons, ‘Must a Four Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?’ The Monist 83 
(2000) 399-418.
11 One might think there are four ways of persisting — counting the stage-view as 
a fourth alternative. Whether this amounts to a distinct way of persisting, i.e. by 
having temporal counterparts, or whether it amounts to a different semantics for 
four-dimensionalism is debatable. 
Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts? 625
and hence can be thought of as terdurantists. Now I will begin to expli-
cate terdurantism, by fi rst considering what our world would need to 
be like for terdurantism to be true, and then developing the strongest 
version of the theory.
1. Terdurantism, Simples and Mereological Universalism
In what follows I make two assumptions. The fi rst is that space-time is 
continuous. The second is that atomism is true: composite objects are 
composed entirely of simples.
Suppose there are simple objects, and composite objects are mereo-
logical fusions of simples. Then what is the nature of these simples, 
and under what circumstances does composition occur? Only some 
answers to these questions are consistent with terdurantism. I begin 
by arguing that the terdurantist should reject the view that simples are 
instantaneous, and instead hold that simples terdure.
Suppose all simples are instantaneous. Consider a set of simples all 
of which exist at t1, such that there is a fusion, S1, of those simples. Call 
a fusion of particulars all of which exist at all and only the same time a 
synchronic fusion. And suppose there exists another synchronic fusion 
of simples — S2 — at t2. Suppose our terdurantist is a mereological uni-
versalist: she holds that for every set S of concrete particulars, there is a 
fusion of the members of S, where x is a fusion of the members of S iff 
every member of S is part of x, and every part of x overlaps some mem-
ber of S. Then there exists some object — D1 — that is the fusion of S1 and 
S2. Call an object that is the fusion of two or more synchronic fusions 
each of which exists at different times, a diachronic fusion. Diachronic 
fusions like D1 perdure: they have synchronic fusions as maximal tem-
poral parts. Mereological universalism guarantees that D1 exists. So if 
terdurantism is the view that all persisting objects terdure, then it can-
not hold both that universalism is true, and that simples are instanta-
neous. Indeed, the terdurantist need not endorse universalism to be 
forced to accept that there exist perduring objects. She need only accept 
that simples are instantaneous, and that cross-temporal composition is 
mereological: persisting objects are fusions of synchronic fusions or of 
instantaneous simples across time. This entails that persisting objects 
perdure.
The terdurantist could endorse the view that simples are instanta-
neous, but hold that composition across time is not mereological.12 That 
is, persisting objects are not related to synchronic fusions as wholes to 
12 I have elsewhere defended an account of non-mereological universalism that 
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parts, but rather, are related to them in some other manner. An endu-
rantist could appeal to the constitution relation, holding that enduring 
objects — which are strictly identical across time — are nevertheless 
constituted at different times by different synchronic fusions. Presum-
ably the terdurantist could employ a similar relation to analogous effect. 
Nevertheless, even having made this move the terdurantist would still 
need to endorse the claim that whenever there exists a terduring object 
O, at every time t at which O exists, there exists some instantaneous 
object I (a synchronic fusion) that materially coincides with O at t. I 
would not be a proper (temporal) part of O, so this is consistent with O 
terduring. However, on this view terdurantism would not be preferable 
to perdurantism with respect to (1a). The terdurantist ontology would 
look just like the perdurantist’s, it would merely be that what appear to 
be segments of a terduring object are not in fact parts of that object.
So a plausible terdurantism requires some background assumptions 
about the furniture of the universe: namely that simples are not instan-
taneous. In order to make the strongest case for terdurantism, in what 
follows I make that assumption.
2. Terduring Simples and Composites
Intuitively, terduring simples are four-dimensional partless objects that 
are not strictly identical across time. Since they are both four-dimen-
sional and simple, they clearly do not perdure, and since they are not 
strictly identical across time, they do not endure. Then:
A simple S terdures iff: (i) S is mereologically simple and (ii) S per-
sists through some temporal interval T which contains instants t 
and t* and (iii) the three-dimensional slice of S at t is not strictly 
identical to the three-dimensional slice of S at t*.
Then it seems natural to think of composite terduring objects as fusions 
of terduring simples. There are, however, two matters to address before 
we can defi ne terdurance for composites. The fi rst concerns exactly 
what the ‘non-perdurantist’ aspect of terdurantism amounts to. The 
second concerns how we should understand primitive parthood if 
composite terduring objects are fusions of terduring simples. I consider 
these matters in order.
Suppose a terduring simple S1 persists through interval T1, and ter-
during simple S2 persists through interval T2, such that T1 and T2 do not 
explicates this latter claim. See K. Miller, ‘Non-Mereological Universalism,’ 
European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2006) 427-45.
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overlap.13 If mereological universalism is true, then there is a fusion of 
S1 and S2. In some good sense, we might say, that object perdures. It has 
two proper maximal temporal parts: S1 and S2. I take it that this is not 
something that should worry the terdurantist. It is a little unexpected 
if it turns out that strictly speaking such an object counts as both per-
during and terduring. But the existence of this object is not antithetical 
to the non-perdurantist motivations of terdurantism. After all, anyone 
who accepts that there can be fusions of objects that exist at wholly 
distinct times, will have to concede that in this sense of perdurance, 
these objects perdure. The terdurantist is at pains to deny a rather richer 
sense of perdurance: the sense in which at every time at which a persist-
ing object exists, it exists at that time in virtue of the existence of some 
instantaneous maximal temporal part at that time.14 It is also at pains to 
deny that for any sub-interval during which a persisting object exists, 
there exists some extended maximal temporal part of that object during 
and only during that sub-interval. In essence, she denies what I’ll call 
the rich perdurantist thesis (RPT):
RPT: For any persisting object O that exists during interval T, and 
for every instant t in T, and every sub-interval I in T (i) there is 
some object O1 that exists at and only at t, (ii) there is some object 
O2 that exists during and only during I, (iii) O1 overlaps every part 
of O at t, (iv) O2 overlaps every part of O during I and (v) O1 and 
O2 are proper parts of O.
Since the fusion of terduring simples S1 and S2 does not entail the truth 
of RPT, the terdurantist need not be worried by the prospect of such an 
object.
This brings us to the second matter for concern: primitive parthood. 
It is natural to take the primitive parthood relation between terduring 
wholes and their parts to be temporally unmodifi ed (as the perduran-
tist does) so that the primitive notion is ‘P is part of O,’ not ‘P is part of 
O at t.’15
To see why, consider the thesis of mereological universalism. Con-
sidered in a temporally unmodifi ed way, mereological universalism is 
the thesis that for any arbitrary set of particulars, there is a fusion of the 
13 There is no instant t that is in both T1 and T2.
14 Or, in a world where space-time is discrete, that a persisting object exists during 
each smallest interval, in virtue of some maximal part existing at that interval.
15 Then y is a fusion of the xs iff every one of the xs is a part of y, and no part of y fails 
to overlap at least one of the xs.
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members of that set. If temporally modifi ed parthood is primitive we 
fuse particulars at times. There are two different ways of thinking about 
primitive temporally modifi ed parthood. Roughly, the fi rst of these 
applies the temporal modifi er to the particulars. The second applies the 
temporal modifi er to the fusion relation. So, if O1 and O2 are persisting 
objects that exist at t, then the fi rst has the form ‘O1-at-t and O2-at-t are 
fused.’ The second has the form ‘O1 and O2 are fused-at-t.’ Shortly I will 
argue in detail that the former should be unattractive to the non-perdu-
rantist. But in a sense we can see why this view will be problematic just 
be looking at the form of the claim. For it seems to require that there is 
some entity, O1-at-t that can be fused, but if that entity exists, it looks 
for all the world as though it is a temporal part of O1. So the idea in the 
argument that follows is that understanding temporally modifi ed part-
hood in this way is to do something akin to presupposing that persist-
ing entities have temporal parts.
If we understand temporally modifi ed parthood as temporally modi-
fying particulars, then universalism is the thesis that for any arbitrary 
set of particulars-at-times, there is a fusion of the members of that set.
Let us say that y is a fusion of the xs at t iff every one of the xs is a part 
of y at t and no part of y fails to overlap at least one of the xs at t. Given 
universalism, for any arbitrary xs at t there is some fusion, y, of the xs at 
t: there is some instantaneous object y, that exists at and only at t, and 
which has each of the xs at t as parts. If universalism guarantees that 
y exists, then it guarantees that for every persisting object O and any 
arbitrary time t at which O exists, there is some instantaneous object O* 
that overlaps every part of O at t: for it guarantees that there is a fusion 
(O*) of the xs at t that are parts of O.16 But this is very close to endorsing 
perdurantism. It means that if we have a persisting object O, we also 
have an object O-at-t that completely overlaps O at t, and so forth for 
every time that O exists. Conceding this would not force the terdura-
ntist to embrace RPT, though it would entail that she embrace clauses 
(i) and (iii). What allows her to avoid the rich perdurantist thesis is that 
she can maintain that the instantaneous objects that overlap persisting 
objects at times are not proper parts of those persisting objects — clause 
(v) does not hold. This, however, is fairly unsatisfactory. Although in 
spirit the terdurantist rejects RPT, she accepts those aspects of it that 
would preclude her from having a suitable response to objection (1a). It 
16 In fact, that outcome seems largely independent of whether we endorse 
universalism or a more restricted composition. Plausibly, whatever restrictions we 
place on composition will be consistent with there existing fusions of the xs at t 
where the xs at t all overlap a single persisting object at t. 
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would therefore be unclear what advantage this form of terdurantism 
would have over perdurantism proper.
Worse, if she does accept universalism this entails that for each sub-
interval at which a persisting object exists, there is a fusion of each of 
the synchronic fusions that overlap that object during that interval. So 
while the restrictivist might get away with endorsing only clauses (i) 
and (iii) of RPT, the universalist must also endorse (ii) and (iv). Fur-
thermore, universalism entails that for any persisting object, there 
is a fusion of all of the instantaneous objects that overlap that object 
at some time. So it entails that for every terduring object, that object 
wholly overlaps some perduring object: that is, for any terduring object 
O with temporal extent T, there is some perduring object P with tempo-
ral extent T, such that at every instant t in T, P overlaps every part of O 
at t. This seems most unappealing. The instantaneous objects that are 
the temporal parts of P need not be temporal parts of O, thus allowing 
the terdurantist to reject clause (v) and hold that O is not identical to P. 
But that hardly makes the view any more attractive, since it essentially 
endorses perdurantism, and adds an additional ontological layer: ter-
during objects. Given this, the terdurantist should reject the idea that 
primitive parthood is temporally modifi ed in this manner.
Indeed, it is easy to see why the terdurantist should think that primi-
tive parthood is not modifi ed in this way. By analogy, we could hold 
that there is a primitive spatially modifi ed parthood relation such that 
we can fuse particulars at spatial locations. Then universalism is the 
thesis that for any arbitrary set of particulars at locations, there is a 
fusion of the members of that set. In a world in which there exist spa-
tially extended simples, this would entail that there is something that 
has as parts, ‘chunks’ of those simples — those simples at locations. 
But if a simple S occupies region R, then there is nothing in sub-region 
R* that could be a part of some further object that is a fusion of, among 
other things, S at R*. Mutatis mutandis for simples at times.
The other option for making sense of temporally modifi ed parthood 
is to apply the temporal modifi er to the fusion relation. Thus we have 
the claim that particulars are fused-at-times. Prima facie, this view 
looks like it might be more amenable. Instead of talking about fusions 
simpliciter, we talk about F-at-t1, F-at-t2, and so forth. This means we 
are not committed to any of the parts of some fusion-at-t themselves 
being instantaneous objects, nor to F-at-t itself being an instantaneous 
object. Hence the threat of tacit committed to the existence of temporal 
parts evaporates. It also explains how objects can gain and lose parts 
over time, since the parts of F-at-t1 might be different to the parts of 
F-at-t2.
So, we might say that F-at-t fuses the xs iff every x is part of F-at-t, 
and no part of F-at-t fails to overlap at least one of the xs at t. But this 
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is problematic. Suppose some non-perduring object O, is one of these 
xs. Is it true that O is part of F-at-t? Surely all of F-at-t’s parts exist at, 
and only at t. Otherwise there is no sense in which the fusion relation is 
temporally modifi ed. But it is not true that O simpliciter is part of F-at-t. 
It looks much more like O properly overlaps F-at-t. O’s parts at t might 
be parts of F-at-t, but O has other parts at other times that are not parts 
of F-at-t. Notice that even if we amend the defi nition by adding in a 
further temporal index it will not help. Suppose we say that F-at-t fuses 
the xs iff at t every x is part of F-at-t and no part of F-at-t fails to overlap 
at least one of the xs at t. It is still not true, at t, that O is part of F-at-t. 
Rather, what we want to say is, roughly, that ‘the bit’ of O that exists at 
t is part of F-at-t. Even if we modify the fusion relation, we still need to 
apply a temporal index to O itself. The worry is that once we apply that 
temporal index, talk of fusing O, at t, is tantamount to talk of fusing O-
at-t. Suppose we try to cash out the idea of fusing O, at t by reference to 
O’s proper parts at t, rather than to talk of O-at-t. Then we say that F-at-t 
fuses O, at t, iff every proper part of O that is located at t, is part of F-at-t. 
The problem is that this just moves the bump in the carpet. Consider the 
proper parts of O that are located at t and are parts of F-at-t. If these parts 
of O are non-perduring objects, then they are not parts of F-at-t. For the 
same reason that O is not part of F-at-t. The only way we can make sense 
of fusing O, at t, without it seeming as though we are really fusing O-at-
t, is to say that F-at-t fuses O, at t iff there is a complete decomposition 
of O at t, such that every part in that decomposition is part of F-at-t. The 
idea is that the parts in the relevant decomposition are parts, simpliciter 
of F-at-t and this is how we make sense of the idea that O, at t, is a part of 
F-at-t. But notice that this in turn requires that there exist instantaneous 
objects, namely the parts that are in the relevant decomposition of O at 
t. For only instantaneous objects could be parts, simpliciter, of F-at-t. But 
if there are such instantaneous objects, then mereological universalism 
will guarantee that there is a fusion of them, and will thus return us to 
endorsing something like perdurantism.
Thus the non-perdurantist should reject the idea that primitive part-
hood is temporally modifi ed. That does not mean that we cannot defi ne 
a notion of temporally modifi ed parthood for terduring objects. Imag-
ine a world w1 in which there exist only three terduring simples, x, y and 
z. Suppose that x terdures from t
1
 to t
5
, y terdures from t
2 to t6, and z ter-
dures from t
3
 to t
7
. Suppose mereological universalism is true. Then in 
w1 there exist four fusions: xy, xz, zy, and xyz. Let us stipulate that these 
fusions are composite terduring objects.17 Then there are times at which 
17 Notice that as defi ned, these objects do not perdure, but so far, all we have said is 
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xyz exists (t7), and xy does not.
18 So there is a sense in which terduring 
objects have particulars as parts at some times and not others. We can 
defi ne temporally modifi ed parthood from the primitive notion, such 
that P is part of F at a time t just if P is part of F, and P and F exist at t. 
Then talk of the parts of a fusion at a time is just talk of its parts simplic-
iter, that exist at that time, not talk of something that is a part-at-a-time 
of that is a fusion-at-a-time, of a part.
Having sorted out these two matters, we can now move on to think 
about composite terduring objects. Here is one possibility:
A complex object O, terdures iff: (i) O persist through some tem-
poral interval T which contains temporal instants t and t* and 
(ii) the three-dimensional slice of O at t is not strictly identical 
to the three-dimensional slice of O at t* and (iii) it is not the case 
that for every instant t in T and sub-interval I in T, that there is 
some object O* that exists at exactly that instant or sub-interval, 
and which overlaps every part of O at that instant or during that 
sub-interval.
Clauses (i) and (ii) simply tell us that an object terdures if it persists 
and is not strictly identical across time. Clause (iii) tells us that terdur-
ing objects are not temporally segmented into maximal temporal parts: 
it tells us that the rich perdurantist thesis is false of terduring objects. 
Notice that this is a fairly strong version of terdurantism, for it entails 
that the rich perdurantist thesis is false not just because clause (v) of 
that thesis fails to hold — the relevant overlapping objects fail to be 
parts of the terduring object. Rather, it is false because there are no such 
overlapping objects: clauses (i) — (iv) are all false. A weaker kind of 
terdurantism might amend clause (iii) of the defi nition to read: it is not 
the case that for every instant t in T and sub-interval I in T, that there 
is some object O* that exists at exactly that instant or sub-interval, and 
which overlaps every part of O at that instant or during that sub-inter-
val, such that O* is a proper part of O. This would allow that clauses (i) 
— (iv) of the RPT could be true of some terduring object, but that cause 
(v) must be false. Since I take it that this is a less attractive view, I will 
stick with the stronger version.
consistent with them being three-dimensional objects: for these fusions could be 
strictly identical across time despite the fact that their parts are not. 
18 I assume that a persisting fusion exists at a time just as long as it least one its parts 
exists at that time.
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Then it seems plausible that terduring composite objects are fusions of 
terduring simples. Let us say that F is a terduring fusion iff F is a fusion 
of terduring simples. If primitive parthood is temporally unmodifi ed, 
it is relatively easy to see why any terduring fusion will meet all of the 
clauses above. Matters are not, however, so straightforward. As we will 
see in the next section, ordinary objects do not seem to be terduring 
fusions.
IV  Fusions and Non-fusions
In the actual world objects lose parts. An object might lose a part 
because the particular that is that part ceases to exist. Call this the weak 
sense of losing a part. A persisting object O loses a part P in this weak 
sense iff (i) P is part of O and (ii) there is some time t at which O exists, 
and P does not. Alternatively, an object might lose a part because the 
particular that is that part simply ceases to be related part-wise to the 
object. Call this the strong sense of losing a part. A persisting object O 
loses a part P in a strong sense iff (i) there is some time t at which P is 
part of O, and (ii) there is some time t* at which both P and O exist, and 
(iii) at t* P is not part of O.
Composite objects lose parts in both of these ways. But no fusion of 
terduring simples loses parts in the strong sense. By defi nition, if P is 
part of O, then for any time at which P and O exist, P is part of O at that 
time. That is what it is for parthood to be temporally unmodifi ed. This 
suggests that everyday objects are not fusions of terduring simples. 
That claim makes good sense if we return to consider world w1 in which 
there exist x, y and z and the different fusions thereof. Though there are 
only four possible fusions in w1, it seems conceivable that there could 
be an object, O
1
, that exists between t
2
 and t
5
 and has spatial parts x and 
y at t
2
, y and z at t
3
, x and z at t
4
, and x, y and z at t
5
. But O
1 is not the 
fusion of x, y and z: that object exists from t
1
 to t
7
. Unlike a fusion, O
1
 
strongly loses parts: it has x as a part at t
2
, but at t
3
 x exists and is not 
part of O
1
. Yet if O
1
 terdures and primitive parthood is not temporally 
modifi ed, then it cannot be the fusion of x and y at t2, y and z at t3 and 
so forth. If that is true, then there is good reason to suppose that many 
actual persisting objects are, like O
1
, non-fusions: persisting objects that 
are not fusions of terduring simples.
Given our defi nition of terduring composites, however, that O1 is not 
a fusion of terduring simples does not entail that it is not a terduring 
object, only that it is not a terduring fusion. So what is O
1
, and what is 
the relation between O
1
 and the fusions in w1? Let us say that O1 is a 
terduring non-fusion, where O is a terduring non-fusion iff (i) O is a com-
posite terduring object and (ii) O is not a fusion of terduring simples.
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What is the relation between O
1
 and the fusions in w1? At t2, O1 and 
xy share the same parts. How do non-fusions have parts? They appear 
to have parts at times, but the notion of parthood at a time is defi ned 
in terms of temporally unmodifi ed parthood, and there is no sense in 
which non-fusions have parts in this latter sense. Plausibly, the answer 
resides in whatever relation it is that holds between O
1 and xy at t2. Pre-
sumably the idea will be that non-fusions in some sense ‘inherit’ their 
‘parts’ from the fusions to which they are related at times: a non-fusion 
O has a part P at t just if at t, O is related to some fusion F that has P as 
a part at t. Clearly we cannot defi ne this relation, on pain of circularity, 
in terms of parthood.
Call the relation that holds between terduring fusions and non-fusions 
at times, the compilation relation. Then we might say that compilation 
occurs just when a fusion and non-fusion spatially coincide.19 Unfortu-
nately, the possibility of inter-penetrable matter (distinct particles that 
can temporarily exist at all of the same space-time points) makes that 
implausible, since we do not want to say that such particles are related 
by compilation. The difference between a case of inter-penetration and 
one of compilation seems to be the intuition that had the fusion not 
existed at the relevant time, then the non-fusion would not have existed 
at that time either, while the same is not true of inter-penetrable par-
ticles. In some sense the non-fusion only exists because the fusion does. 
So we might say that what it is for a non-fusion to exist at a time, is to be 
compiled by a fusion at that time. Not so for inter-penetrable particles. 
Suppose particles P and P* are inter-penetrable and that they spatially 
coincide at time t and location L. Then there is a robust sense in which 
had P not existed at t and L, P* would still have existed at that time and 
location.20 The existence of P is independent of the existence of P*, it is 
contingent that they spatially coincide.
19 Where to spatially coincide is not simply to exist within the same spatial boundary, 
but to exist at all and only the same spatial points. Notice that we cannot defi ne 
compilation in terms of material coincidence at a time on pain of circularity, since 
that is in turn defi ned in terms of parthood at a time.
20 Actually this is not quite right. Even if we set aside worries about deviant causal 
chains, if it turns out that P and P* have some sort of charge, then it might be the 
case that had P not existed at the relevant time and location, then although P* 
would still have existed, it would have existed at a slightly different location. In 
fact, this might even be nomologically necessary. Then there is no robust sense in 
which had P not existed at L at t, then P* would still have existed at L at t. Then to 
capture the sense in which P and P* are independent, we could say something like 
the following: P and P* are independent and distinct just if there is some world 
that is identical to our world up to time t, such that when at t, God makes it the 
case that P does not exist, it is still the case that P* exists at t at L. The idea here is 
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This suggests that a fusion compiles a non-fusion at a time if the exis-
tence of the fusion at that time entails the existence of the non-fusion at 
that time. Hence:
Compilation: A fusion F compiles a non-fusion O at a time t iff (i) 
F and O exist at t, and (ii) The existence of O at t is entailed by F 
existing at t and F having the intrinsic properties at t that it does 
and (iii) there is no proper part of F whose existence entails the 
existence of O at t.21
This defi nition captures the sense in which the truth maker for the 
claim that there exists a non-fusion at t is that there exists some fusion 
at t, with a particular set of intrinsic properties at t, such that the exis-
tence of that fusion with those properties entails the existence of the 
non-fusion at that time. In what follows I will say nothing about under 
what circumstances fusions at times compile non-fusions. Presumably 
they do not always do so (though it is consistent with terdurantism 
that they do). As I just defi ned compilation, the existence of the rel-
evant fusion, with the intrinsic properties it has, is suffi cient for the 
existence of a non-fusion at a time. This is a nice simplifying assump-
tion that I will accept for the remainder of the paper. Of course, one 
might think that other factors are relevant to whether some non-fusion 
exists at a time, such as which other non-fusions exist at that time, and 
what relations holds between these non-fusions. Then the defi nition 
above could be amended to include whatever other features one has 
in mind.22
just that at t, God could make it the case that P does not exist, yet P* would still 
exist at the same location. I thank David Braddon-Mitchell for this suggestion.
21 Notice that clause (iii) is required in order to prevent its being the case that, for 
instance, fusion xy compiles at t
2
 some non-fusion O
2
 that has spatial part x as an 
improper part at t
2
.
22 For a defense of something like this position see K. Miller, ‘Thing and Object’ 
Acta Analytica (forthcoming). One might worry that if enough ‘contextual’ or 
‘conventional’ sorts of features are included in the defi nition of a non-fusion, 
this might lead us to eliminativism about ordinary objects. The idea, perhaps, 
is that ordinary objects only really exist if their properties are independent of 
our conventions. It seems to me that this is a controversial claim about what is 
required to vindicate realism, and certainly not one that a realist must endorse. 
Something might count as a work of art only if certain artistic conventions hold. 
So the existence of a work of art might in part supervene on the existence of these 
conventions. But, as I see it, conventions are perfectly real thing themselves — they 
supervene on the behaviours of persons and institutions over time — they are not, 
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This notion of compilation requires that one embrace a sort of modi-
fi ed Humeanism about necessary connections between distinct exis-
tences. Unlike straight Humeanism, it allows that such connections do 
exist — between compiling and compiled objects. On the other hand 
such connections only exist between compiling and compiled objects. 
We do not want it to be the case that there could exist a necessary con-
nection between a fusion at location L, and a non-fusion at location 
L*, since we do not want this to count as a case of compilation. We 
could introduce an extra clause into the defi nition, so that a fusion F 
compiles a non-fusion O at t only if at t, F and O spatially coincide. But 
suppose F1 is a fusion of inter-penetrable particles and non-fusion O1 
has inter-penetrable particles as parts at times. Suppose further that at 
t
1
 F1 and O1 spatially coincide. Then it is consistent with the amended 
defi nition that F1 compiles O1 at t1. The point is that it is not spatial 
coincidence or lack thereof that marks out the difference between com-
pilation and a failure of compilation: what marks out the difference is 
whether the entities in question are genuinely independent or not. If F1 
does not compile O1 at t1, it is because its existence at that time does not 
entail the existence of O1 at that time. This tells us that cases of compi-
lation exhaust all and only the necessary connections between distinct 
objects.
Where does that leave us? In essence, the terdurantist holds that there 
exist various fusions of terduring simples: terduring fusions, each of 
which are related to their parts by a temporally unmodifi ed parthood 
relation. Ordinary objects are not related to their parts in this way; nor 
are they fusions of parts at times. Rather they are related, by compila-
tion, to different terduring fusions at different times, and they have as 
parts at those times, the parts of the fusion that compile them at that 
time.
So we have an account of how terduring non-fusions are related to 
terduring fusions at times. That still leaves the question of what to say 
about cases where two or more non-fusions (such as persons and bod-
ies) coincide at times. Plausibly, the terdurantist will say that what it 
is for two or more non-fusions to materially coincide at a time, is to be 
related in the same way to a fusion that compiles each of them at that 
time. Call this relation the co-compilation relation. Hence:
in most cases, mere decisions of fi at. So it is not clear why having conventions in 
this sense in the supervenience base for the existence of objects ought to lead us to 
be eliminativists about those objects. Of course, I cannot argue for this here, and 
since for the remainder of the paper I do not include such features in the defi nition 
of a non-fusion, we can set the issue aside. After all, this worry is really orthogonal 
to whether terdurantism is true.
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Co-compilation: For any two or more non-fusions O and O*, O 
and O* are co-compiled at t just if the fusion that compiles O at t 
also compiles O* at t.
Then materially coinciding non-fusions are not directly related, rather, 
they are related indirectly in virtue of both being related to some third 
object, the fusion that compiles each of them at some time.
As I see it, the view just outlined is the strongest version of terdu-
rantism. In the next section I will argue that it faces a number of prob-
lems.
V  Problems for Terdurantism
1. Kinds of Objects
Terdurantism is committed to the existence of two kinds of persisting 
objects: fusions and non-fusions. If not problematic, one might suppose 
that is at least unattractive.
That is perhaps a little hasty. Strictly speaking nothing about terdu-
rantism entails that any non-fusions exist. It is a further claim of the 
terdurantism I have described that it holds that certain fusions com-
pile non-fusions. But the motivation for this claim is strong: everyday 
objects are not fusions of terduring simples, for they strongly gain and 
lose parts.23 Now, one might simply bite the bullet here, and be elimina-
23 One might be tempted to say something else. Namely, that the appearance of strong 
part loss is just that, mere appearance. Perdurantists might seem to be making that 
claim. After all, perduring objects are mereological fusions of temporal parts, and 
hence, do not strongly lose any parts. But some perduring objects are ordinary 
objects. So if the perdurantist can have ordinary objects without strong part loss, 
maybe the terdurantist can too. In that case, the terdurantist might not need non-
fusions in her ontology.
  But this will not work. Why does it seem as though ordinary objects strongly 
lose parts if perdurantism is true? Well, consider a perduring object O that exists at 
t1 and t2. It is the fusion of temporal parts O-at-t1 and O-at-t2. It never gains or loses 
these parts: it has them both tenselessly. O-at-t1 has spatial parts: P1 and P2. O-at-t2 
has spatial parts P2 and P3. O-at-t1 never loses any spatial part, and neither does O-
at-t2 (obviously, since they have no duration in which to lose anything). But there is 
some sense in which O does lose a part, namely P1. And this is not a mere ‘seeming.’ 
Suppose P1 persists. The temporal part of P1 that is part of O-at-t1 does, not exist at 
t2. This is why, strictly speaking, O does not lose a part: because there is no wholly 
present object that exists at t1 and is part of O at t1, and which exists at t2 and is not 
part of O at t2.
  But when we say that O loses a part we can plausibly be held to be making the 
following claim. If perduring object O has perduring object P1 as a (spatial) part 
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tivist about non-fusions. Strictly speaking composition is mereological, 
and the only composite objects that exist are fusions. But we sometimes 
talk as though there exist some other objects: objects that are arrange-
ments, at different times, of different fusions. But we could translate 
any such talk into talk about fusions at times. I cannot say that I fi nd 
this line promising. Eliminativism about everyday object does not strike 
me as a particularly plausible view. So while embracing eliminativism 
would dissolve the need for two distinct kinds of entity, it could equally 
be counted as a signifi cant cost to terdurantism.
Assuming that one is not an eliminativist about everyday objects, 
the terdurantist is committed to the existence of both fusions and non-
fusions. This is no fatal objection. But it is odd. It is especially odd when 
one considers the natures of the objects in question. For we might have 
tended to think of ordinary objects as the paradigm objects, and odd 
gerrymandered objects as merely fusions of those ordinary objects at 
times and places. For the terdurantist though, the basic persisting com-
posite objects are fusions. Depending on the longevity of the terdur-
ing simples of which these composites are composed, the composites 
might be long-lived things that are most of the time massively spatially 
scattered and not at all object-like. It is entirely conceivable that actu-
ally, there are various fusions of simples many of which existed at the 
time of the big bang, most of which were scattered throughout space 
for millions of years, and which briefl y coalesced on earth for a short 
period before dispersing again into the cosmos. It is when these simples 
at some time (and hence O-at-t has P1-at-t as a part simpliciter), then O counts as 
strongly losing P1 if P1 exists at a time other than t1 in virtue of a tn part existing at 
tn, such that the tn part of P1 is not a part of any temporal part of O. The point is 
just that ordinary talk about part loss has to be reconstrued as talk about perduring 
parts. Once understood that way, then perduring objects are such that at one time 
some perduring object is part of them, and at another time that perduring object is 
not part of them. This is what makes ordinary talk about part loss true.
  Now, more to the point, the terdurantist cannot tell any such story. To put it 
another way, because the perdurantist has access to instantaneous or short-lived 
temporal parts, for any ordinary object I describe, such that I claim that that object 
has different parts at different times, the perdurantist can ‘construct’ a perduring 
object that has just those parts at just those times, by being composed of the 
relevant temporal parts at those times. If I say that O has P at t1 and loses P at t2, 
then the perdurantist will say that O is a fusion of parts that includes P-at-t1, and 
does not include P-at-t2. But the terdurantist does not have the apparatus to do 
this. If P is a non-perduring object, then any fusion that includes P will always 
include P, so there is no sense at all in which a fusion can lose P. Whereas if P is 
a perduring object, then a fusion can include P-at-t1, but not P-at-t2 and hence the 
perdurantist can make sense of an object like O, whereas the terdurantist cannot. 
At least, she cannot if O is supposed to be a fusion. 
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thus coalesce, that we are inclined to say that their fusion compiles, at 
a time, some non-fusion. So the picture is one in which our basic ontol-
ogy might involve objects that are for most of their existence spatially 
scattered. Everyday objects are not part of this basic ontology, rather, 
they come into existence just on the occasions when the basic fusions 
compile some non-fusion at a time.24
While that is perfectly coherent, it is not the usual picture we have 
in mind when we think of composition and objecthood, particularly 
given that for the terdurantist, it is fusions that are ontologically basic. 
Non-fusions exist at times solely in virtue of being related to fusions 
by the compilation relation. Notice that this means that we need a lot 
of fusions. The terdurantist might not be a universalist, but regardless 
of how she restricts composition, if she is not to be an eliminativist 
about ordinary objects she will need to admit into her ontology enough 
fusions to compile the non-fusions whose existence we are commit-
ted to. And since normal composite objects gain and lose a lot of parts 
across time, this means they are compiled by different fusions at many 
different times at which they exist. Ultimately, then, the terdurantist 
is committed not only to the existence of two quite different kinds of 
24 There are two rather distinct worries here. One is that fusions turn out to be more 
ontologically basic than objects rather than the other way around, and the other 
is that the fusions there are, are very unlike any of our ordinary objects. I think 
it is the combination of these two claims that is unattractive. While it is no part 
of perdurantism that fusions are ontologically more basic than objects, some 
perdurantists do hold this additional thesis. This perdurantist thesis about the 
direction of fundamentality is that parts are more fundamental than wholes, and 
hence that temporal parts are more fundamental that persisting objects. This is a 
rather different claim to the claim the terdurantist makes about the direction of 
fundamentality, which is that fusions, one kind of object, are more basic than non-
fusions, a different kind of object that supervenes on the former. But one might 
think that the terdurantist is no worse off in making her claim about the direction 
of fundamentality than is the perdurantist in making her somewhat different claim. 
I think the force of the objection, though, lies fi rst in the fact that the perdurantist 
claim about fundamentality is purely optional, whereas the terdurantist claim 
about fundamentality is not, and second, that even for perdurantists who accept 
the fundamentality claim, at least some of the parts they take to be fundamental 
are pretty ordinary. If mereological universalism is true, then some fusions are odd, 
and there’s no getting around that. But temporal parts of ordinary objects are pretty 
ordinary — they are things that look just like ordinary objects at a time. This is not 
the case for the terdurantist: she has nothing in her fundamental ontology of fusions 
that looks like an ordinary object. All fusions turn out to be odd, gerrymandered 
or scattered entities, and only non-fusions are like ordinary objects. Perhaps it is 
controversial the extent to which this is a cost of terdurantism, but certainly there 
are very real differences between terdurantism and perdurantism to be found 
here.
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objects, but also to the existence of a lot of odd scattered objects: the 
many terduring fusions that compile everyday objects at times.
It is diffi cult to evaluate exactly to what extent terdurantism falls foul 
of the objection to perdurantism we fi nd in (1a). (1a), recall, charges 
perdurantism with being ontologically profl igate in virtue of the exis-
tence of a plethora of temporal parts where we see a single persisting 
object. A terdurantism that is not eliminativist about ordinary objects 
— even a terdurantism that is restrictive about composition — will 
still be committed to the existence of a plethora of largely spatially and 
temporally scattered fusions. So terdurantism is quite ontologically 
profl igate. On the other hand, it does allow us to reject the idea that 
persisting entities are composed of a series of distinct temporal parts 
that pass into and out of existence ’before our eyes’. At least, there is an 
extent to which it accomplishes this. Terduring fusions are very clearly 
not temporally segmented. There is no sense in which there is a series 
of wholly distinct entities that are related in some way to that fusion 
— whether as parts or not. It is also true that ordinary objects — terdur-
ing non-fusions — are not composed, at each time at which they exist, 
of distinct objects. Such objects have no maximal temporal parts. On the 
other hand, insofar as ordinary objects are (strongly) gaining and los-
ing parts across time, they are compiled at different times, by different 
fusions. It is these fusions that are ontologically basic. So at each time at 
which a terduring non-fusion is present, it is in virtue of some distinct 
fusion being present at that time. While ‘watching’ a non-fusion across 
time is not watching something that is literally temporally segmented, 
insofar as the existence of that non-fusion is entailed by the existence 
of a plethora of different fusions at times, it is watching that series of 
distinct fusions at each of those times. It is, therefore, not obvious that 
the terdurantist fares all that much better in this respect than the perdu-
rantist, but with the added cost of a bi-partite ontology of fusions and 
non-fusions.
2. Instantiating Properties
I suggested that the terdurantist might have a preferable account of 
property instantiation to either the perdurantist or the endurantist, 
hence avoiding objections (2) and (2a). The idea is that the terdurantist 
will not analyse the instantiation of temporary properties in terms of the 
properties simpliciter, of (maximal temporal) parts of persisting objects. 
Rather, the properties we attribute to terduring objects are indeed prop-
erties of those objects, not of their parts. Nor does the terdurantist need 
to reconcile her account of property talk with the notion that persisting 
objects are literally strictly identical across time, and hence she need not 
appeal to the relativisation, in some way, of properties. In this section, 
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however I will argue that the terdurantist is no better off than the endu-
rantist or the perdurantist when it comes to explicating talk of tempo-
rary properties.
How will the terdurantist understand property instantiation? Local 
intrinsics, naturally enough, can be understood in terms of an object 
having a spatial part that instantiates some property simpliciter. Tem-
porary properties, however, must require some sort of instantiation 
relation. Since temporary properties are properties of the whole four-
dimensional object, they cannot straightforwardly be properties sim-
pliciter of that object, on pain of contradiction. The terdurantist could 
simply import the analysis already developed by endurantists, and talk 
of instantiating properties at times, or in temporal ways: at-t or t-ly. 
Then terdurantism would solve (2a), but not (2), and we would have no 
reason to prefer the view to endurantism. But the instantiation relation 
need not be temporal. Since the terdurantist is not preoccupied with 
the idea that persisting objects are both strictly identical to themselves 
at every time at which they exist and wholly present whenever they 
exist, she is not committed to the idea that there is something special 
about a three-dimensional ‘slice’25 of a persisting object. For it is not 
the case that such a slice just is a wholly present (3D) object at a par-
ticular time. Hence the terdurantist could just as well talk of having 
properties at space-time regions, where these regions need not corre-
spond to some three-dimensional ‘slice’ of the four-dimensional worm. 
The region could be four-dimensionally extended. So terduring objects 
would instantiate temporary properties at a region, or in a particular 
regional manner: at-R, or R-ly. Then for any terduring object that has 
different properties at different times, the terdurantist must appeal to 
some irreducible instantiation relation: at-R or R-ly.
It is clear, at least with respect to terduring simples, why this rela-
tion must be irreducible. In the case of local intrinsics some instantia-
tion relation — say, instantiating a property at a location, (at-L) or, in 
a locational manner (L-ly) — would be reducible just so long as the 
relation could be analysed in terms of having a spatial part at that loca-
tion with that property. But this cannot be so where we are consider-
ing some terduring simple: there are no candidates for reduction for 
there are no parts. Likewise this is the case for terduring fusions. Pre-
cisely because such fusions are not temporally segmented, there is no 
prospect for reducing the instantiation relation.26 In the case of terdur-
25 I use scare quotes here to remind the reader that a slice is not an instantaneous 
temporal part of a persisting object.
26 One helpful referee has pointed out that what at the beginning of the paper I called 
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ing non-fusions, the temporary properties of such objects are in some 
sense reducible to the properties of the fusions that compile them at 
times. But since the properties of the fusions are themselves irreducibly 
‘regionalised’, ultimately the reduction fails here too. Whenever some 
persisting entity has different properties at different times, it must be 
because it instantiates some irreducibly regionalised property, or some 
irreducibly regionalised instantiation relation.
Given that the terdurantist must commit herself to there being an 
irreducible instantiation relation, and thus to its being the case that 
temporary properties are never straightforwardly instantiated simplic-
iter, the view does not seem any improvement on endurantism.
3. Substantivalism and Relationalism; Monism and Dualism
Here is another reason to prefer perdurantism to terdurantism. There is 
a general question of what the terdurantist should say about the rela-
tions between objects, and the relations between space-time regions on 
the one hand, and the relations between objects and space-time regions 
on the other hand. Let us introduce some distinctions. Let us say that 
substantivilists are realists about space-time regions and, if they exist, 
space-time points. Relationists hold that space-time regions and points 
are not ontologically real: talk of space-time regions is not talk about 
some entity, a space-time region. Rather, talk of space-time regions is 
really just talk about locations in space-time, which is ultimately reduc-
ible to talk about the relative spatial and temporal distances between 
objects.
‘weak’ terdurantism is consistent with being able to reduce the instantiation of 
properties of a non-fusion at a time, to the properties simpliciter of the fusion that 
compiles it at that time. Weak terdurantism does not guarantee that one can do this, 
since all weak terdurantism allows is that there might exist shorter-lived objects 
that wholly coincide with terduring fusions at times, but are not parts of those 
fusions. It does not guarantee that this is the case, nor certainly guarantee the 
stronger claim for every temporal interval and instant at which a fusion F exists, 
there is some fusion F* that exists during, or at, just that time and coincides with 
F at or during those times. A weak terdurantism with ‘insuffi cient’ coinciding 
fusions would still have problems because there might not be a coinciding object 
that exists at the relevant time or during the relevant interval, that has the relevant 
property simpliciter. So while weak terdurantism might have some advantages 
here, I have focused exclusively on strong terdurantism throughout because weak 
terdurantism is generally unattractive, at least as an alternative to perdurantism, 
insofar as it allows that there exists entities that are very much like temporal 
parts, albeit that they are not parts of persisting objects but are merely entities that 
coincide with those objects at times. 
642 Kristie Miller
There is another distinction that cuts across the substantivilist/rela-
tionalist distinction: the monist/dualist distinction.27 Monists hold that 
the relation between space-time regions and the objects that exist at 
those regions28 is one of identity. Dualists hold that there exist onto-
logically real space-time regions such that some of those regions are 
occupied by objects that are distinct from those regions. Dualists are 
necessarily substantivilists. Monism, on the other hand, comes in two 
fl avours: substantivilist and relational. Substantival monists think that 
space-time regions are ontologically real, and that objects are to be iden-
tifi ed with those regions or the pattern of properties possessed by them. 
Relational monists think that only objects exist, and to the extent that 
we can talk about space-time regions, we are really just talking about 
those objects and the relations between them.
Perdurantism is consistent with all three views: substantival monism, 
substantival dualism and relational monism. Indeed, perdurantists 
have a nice story to tell regardless of the view they adopt. For perdu-
rantism preserves a mirroring relation between objects and space-time 
regions. Let us say that an account of objects and their persistence mir-
rors an account of space-time and its regions, iff the relation that holds 
between regions and sub-regions of space-time is the same relation that 
holds between the objects that exist at those regions and sub-regions of 
space-time. Further, let us say that we have an exact mirroring iff for any 
object O1 that occupies region R1, it is the case that for any sub-region 
R* of R1 that is related to R1 by relation R, there is some object O* that 
exists at and only at R* and is related to O1 by the R relation. So if rela-
tion R is the mereology relation, then we will have what Simons calls 
the GCP: the geometric correspondence principle, according to which 
any extended object has parts corresponding to the parts of the region 
at which the object exists.29
Consider synchronic mirroring: mirroring at a time. Perdurantists, 
endurantists and terdurantists can all agree that there is exact syn-
chronic mirroring. They agree that the relation that holds between a 
(spatial) region R1 at t1, and the sub-regions of R1 at t1, is the part/whole 
27 This terminology is from D. Lewis, On The Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell 
1986), n. 55, on 76.
28 I use the locution of objects ‘existing at regions’ as neutral terminology between 
objects being identical to the regions at which they exist, and occupying the regions 
at which they exist.
29 P. Simons, ‘Extended Simples: A Third Way Between Atoms and Gunk,’ The Monist 
87 (2004) 371-85. Simons’ GCP is phrased slightly differently, in terms of objecting 
having parts corresponding to the parts of the region the object occupies. I prefer 
this version, since it is neutral between monism and dualism. 
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relation. So too they agree that the relation that holds between object O1 
that exists at R1 at t1, and the objects that exist at each of the sub-regions 
of R1 at t1, is the part/whole relation: the objects that exist at the sub-
regions of R1 at t1 are spatial parts of O1 at t1.
30 The perdurantist also 
holds that there is what we might call diachronic mirroring. She holds 
that the relation that holds between a four-dimensional volume R2, and 
the sub-regions of R2 is the part/whole relation, while the relation that 
holds between the four-dimensional object O2 that exists at R2 and the 
objects that exist at the sub-regions of R2, is also the part/whole rela-
tion: in the latter case the objects that exist at the sub-regions of R2 are 
temporal parts of O2. Moreover, the perdurantist can hold that this mir-
roring is exact: it is the same relation in both cases. Since perdurantists 
can straightforwardly accept the GCP, perdurantism is consistent with 
either monism or dualism: one can hold either that the relation between 
regions of space-time and four-dimensional objects is one of identity, or 
one of occupancy.
Terdurantists must deny that there is an exact mirroring, since they 
deny that there is diachronic mirroring. This means denying the GCP 
which in turns means denying that objects are identical to the regions at 
which they exist. If terdurantism is true, then monism must be false.31
Of course, one might have independent reason to think that monism 
is false. One might suppose that the relation between objects and the 
regions at which they exist must be contingent, as is attested by the fact 
that each have different modal properties. Objects could have existed 
at regions other than the regions they in fact exist at, while regions lack 
this property. Whatever one thinks of this objection to monism32 at the 
30 This is not to say that they must agree that there is exact synchronic mirroring. 
Those who reject the doctrine of undetached arbitrary parts with respect to objects 
but not regions will deny that the mirroring is exact. Those who hold that simples 
are not only four-dimensionally extended, but extended in space as well will also 
deny that the mirroring is exact.
31 There is a difference here between an atomistic terdurantism and a gunk 
terdurantism. The former can accept that there is an exact synchronic mirroring, 
while the latter cannot. But all terdurantists deny that there is exact diachronic 
mirroring. Gunk terdurantists deny that there is diachronic mirroring, because 
they hold that some of the occupied sub-regions of any four-dimensional stream 
of gunk are not parts of that gunk, though they are, presumably, parts of the region 
that the gunk occupies. Atomistic terdurantists deny that there is diachronic 
mirroring, because they hold that for any extended simple S, there are sub-regions 
occupied by that simple that are not parts of the simple, though those sub-regions 
are parts of the region occupied by the simple.
32 Sider, for instance, rejects it on the grounds that an appeal to counterpart theory 
and contingent identity allow us to say that though the very same things are picked 
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very least it is noteworthy that we have another metaphysical question 
that terdurantists are committed to answering one way, rather than any 
other: it seems that many doors are closed to the terdurantist.
Moreover, we might suppose that having to reject the exact mirror-
ing principle, and specifi cally the GCP, is itself a cost. Again, this will 
depend how independently plausible one fi nds these principles. There 
are those who don’t fi nd them plausible at all.33 It is not possible, within 
the space constraints, to consider the plausibility of these principles. 
Suffi ce to say that something like the GCP is, I think, fairly widely 
accepted, and so it would be seen by many to be at least some sort of 
cost to terdurantism that it must reject these principles.
So far then, we have seen both that there are a number of costs to 
terdurantism, and that despite appearances it does not really deliver on 
its promise to provide a plausible middle ground theory of persistence. 
But what lessons can we take from that failure?
VI  Endurantism Considered
Endurantists deny that persisting objects are composed of temporal 
parts. Given this, they must inevitably develop a view that is strictly anal-
ogous to terdurantism, but with the added codicil that enduring objects 
are strictly identical across time, rather than being four-dimensionally 
extended. They too must reject the idea of instantaneous simples; they 
too must hold that persisting objects are fusions of, in their case, endur-
ing simples; they too must admit that ordinary objects are not identi-
cal to such persisting fusions; they too must reject exact mirroring and 
the GCP; they too must accept some irreducible instantiation relation. 
This must be the case, because it is the terdurantist’s attempt to avoid 
being committed to the existence of temporally segmented objects that 
out by the designation ‘object’ as by ‘space-time region’, nevertheless each of these 
designations have attached to them different sets of counterpart relation — region-
relations and object-relations — such that not all of the region-counterparts are also 
object-counterparts and vice versa, thus explaining why objects and regions have 
different modal properties despite being identical. T. Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, 
110-13.
33 P. Simons, ‘Extended Simples,’ 371-85; P. Van Inwagen, ‘The Doctrine of Arbitrary 
Undetached Parts,’ Pacifi c Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981) 123-37; N. Markosian, 
‘Simples, Stuff and Simple People,’ The Monist 87 (2004) 405-21. In the case of 
Simons and Markosian, this is at least in part motivated by a particular view about 
extended simples.
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pushes her to each of these claims, and this is precisely the same com-
mitment that the endurantist makes.
Perhaps what is controversial here is that the endurantist must reject 
the idea that ordinary object are not identical to persisting fusions. For 
here, perhaps, one might be inclined to argue that while terdurantists 
ought not accept a temporally modifi ed parthood relation, endurantists 
surely should. And if parthood is temporally modifi ed, then we can 
construe ordinary objects that strongly lose parts as fusions of different 
particulars at different times. Hence there will be no need to appeal to 
an apparatus of fusions and non-fusions that are related in some mys-
terious way at times. The endurantist ontology will not look like the 
rather odd terdurantist’s ontology that I described earlier.
But I think this is a mistake. The reason the endurantist should reject 
temporally modifi ed parthood is not the same as the terdurantist’s 
reason for rejecting it. What is the same is that in either case, embrac-
ing temporally modifi ed parthood entails embracing, at a minimum, 
the claim that for every composite persisting object and every time at 
which that composite exists, there exists an instantaneous object that 
overlaps all and only the parts of that object at each of those times. 
Embracing temporally modifi ed parthood is embracing something that 
is tantamount to a perdurantist ontology, minus the claim about the 
manner in which these instantaneous objects are related to persisting 
objects — minus the mereological claim. And that is surely something 
that endurantists want to deny. Unlike in the case of terdurantism, the 
endurantist does not reject such a parthood relation on the grounds that 
we can only fuse whole particulars, and that simples are four-dimen-
sionally extended and hence not whole at a time. Rather, it appeals to 
the fact that we can only fuse distinct particulars, and that enduring par-
ticulars are strictly identical across time. For the terdurantist, it makes 
no sense to fuse simples at times, because there is no whole entity, at 
each of those times, to fuse: to be a part of the fusion in question. The 
reverse is true for the endurantist. Here it makes no sense to talk of 
fusing particulars at times, because it only makes sense to fuse distinct 
particulars. But there is no guarantee that the xs at t and the ys at t* are 
not one and the same enduring things, which makes a nonsense out of 
mereological universalism.
That being said, it seems that the endurantist is faced with the very 
same problems as the terdurantist. With the exception of an appeal to 
irreducibly relativised properties, or an irreducible instantiation rela-
tion, these objections are not the standard objections to be found in the 
literature. They have nothing to do with whether objects are, or could 
be, strictly identical across time, or whether it makes sense to talk of 
objects being wholly present whenever they exist. These problems are 
not only novel, but more importantly, they allow us to abstract away 
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from issues which, at least in part, frequently seem to come down to 
brute intuition on both sides.
VII  Lessons Learned
So what are the lessons learned here? Well, the fi rst lesson is that four-
dimensionalists should be perdurantists, and that is perhaps no great 
surprise. But it is noteworthy that perdurance is resilient in the way 
it is: it is not merely that perdurantist versions of four-dimensional-
ism are on the whole preferable to non-perdurantist theories. Rather, 
it is that once one strays from perdurantism, one’s theory begins to 
look very implausible indeed: trying to construct any version of four-
dimensionalism that does not appeal to the apparatus of temporal 
parts is diffi cult, and even the most plausible of such theories is faced 
with problems. Moreover, these very same problems plague non-four-
dimensionalist theories that are non-perdurantist. Endurantism has the 
same problems. This suggests that temporal parts are resilient: they are 
a fundamental aspect of any plausible theory of persistence.
This further suggests that many of the traditional objections to endu-
rantism have been misplaced. For none of the problems faced by terdu-
rantism or endurantism rest on explicating any sense in which objects 
are wholly present whenever they exist. Nor do they rest on attempting 
to make sense, in the context of Leibniz Law, of how an object with one 
set of parts and properties that occupies one three-dimensional region 
of space-time, can be strictly identical to an object with a different set of 
parts and properties that occupies a different three-dimensional region 
of space-time. Rather, the problems that endurantism faces are prob-
lems that any non-perdurantist theory faces. The true lesson of terdu-
rantism then, is that temporal parts are resilient: any plausible theory 
of persistence will be a perdurantist one. We should, it would seem, all 
believe in temporal parts.
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